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GOODMAN

[S. F. No. 18688.

v.

HARRIS

In Bank.

[40 C.2d

Feb. 17, 1953.]

ARTHUR RALPH GOODMAN et al., Appellants, v. E. L.
HARRIS et al., Defendants; PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY, Respondent.
[1] Landlord and Tenant-Injuries to Third. Persons-Patrons of
Lessee.-A lessor who leases property for a purpose involving the admission of the public is under a duty to see that
it is safe for the purposes intended, and to exercise reasonable care to inspect and repair the property before possession
is transferred so as to prevent any unreasonable risk of harm
to the public who may enter.
[2] Fixtures-Questions of Law and Fact.-Whether a butane gas
heater was so affixed to leased premises as to become a part
of the realty belonging to the lessor rather than personalty
belonging to the lessees is not an issue of fact to be submitted to the jury where the evidence shows that such heater
was a small and easily portable piece of equipment, not
fastened down in any manner but "just sitting there" on
the floor, and that, while it was connected to a gas pipe inlet,
it could be detached simply and easily without affecting the
premises.
[3] Landlord and Tenant-Injuries to Third Persons-Evidence.An inference that a cabin equipped with an unvented butane
gas heater on premises leased for operation of a motel was
unsuitable for human occupancy may not be drawn from
evidence that the cabin did not meet statutory requirements
of construction for rental as an overnight accommodation
for transients, especially where the state's inspector told the
lessees that it was permissible to rent the cabin by the week
or month, and where it appears that the cabin had a vent
which could be connected with a heating unit, that the vent
was not faulty, and that the cabin had windows and a door
which could be opened easily.
[4] !d.-Injuries to Third Persons-Evidence.-Mere fact that a
gas feeder line entered a cabin, equipped with a defective
unvented heater on premises leased for operation of a motel,
at a point on the wall opposite the location of a vent is not
[1] Landlord's liability for personal injuries to one who enters
as a business patron on leased premises within tenant's exclusive
control, note, 123 A.L.R. 870. See, also, Cal.Jur., Landlord and
Tenant, § 150; Am.Jur., Landlord and Tenant, § 667.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Landlord and Tenant, § 316; [2]
Fixtures,§ 27; [3, 4] Landlord and Tenant,§ 318(2); [5-10] Landlord and Tenant, § 318.
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basis for an inference that a safe heating unit could not have
been installed where there is no showing that the pipe was
incapable of extension, that a vented heater could not have
been installed, or that a proper unvented heater would have
been unsafe if installed.
[5] !d.-Injuries to Third Persons-Patrons of Lessee.-A lessor
of premises leased for operation of a motel may not be held
liable for death of one motel guest and permanent injury to
another as a result of excessive carbon monoxide fumes from
a defective butane gas heater in a cabin which they were
occupying overnight, where the evidence at most discloses
the negligent operation of such heater in the cabin which
was otherwise safe and suitable for human habitation, and
where there is no basis for the inference that the heater,
although defective, would have caused injury if operated with
circumspection in a properly ventilated room.
[6] !d.-Injuries to Third Persons-Patrons of Lessee.-A lessor
of premises leased for operation of a motel may be held liable
for death of one motel guest and permanent injury to another, which resulted from asphyxiation by carbon monoxide
fumes from a defective butane gas heater in a cabin which
they were occupying overnight, only if the lessor was responsible for a latent dangerous condition of lessees' property
at the time of execution of the lease, there being no liability
for defective condition of property other than that leased or
existing as a structural part of the property leased.
[7] !d.-Injuries to Third Persons-Liability of Lessor.-Where
injury to third persons results from activity of lessee on
premises which, by reason of some defect, are not reasonably
suitable for such conduct, the lessor may be held liable, not
for the fault of the lessee, but only for his own fault in
renting property not safe for the activity to be conducted.
[8] !d.-Injuries to Third Persons-Duties of Lessor.-Duty of
invitor-lessor with respect to safety of leased premises does
not extend to matters having to do merely with lessee's management or operation of premises which would be safe but
for such management or operation, at least where the lessee
is in sole actual control.
[9] !d.-Injuries to Third Persons-Duties of Lessor.-A lessor
of premises leased for operation of a motel has a duty to
see that the property is reasonably safe for the purposes for
which it is to be used and the right to repair such defects
as he might discover in the premises, but he is under no obligation to inspect property which he does not own and which
lessee intends to use in operation of his business.
[10] !d.-Injuries to Third Persons-Duties of Lessor.-The rule
that a lessor must make his property safe for the purposes
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for which it is to be used cannot be extended to require him
to insure, against defects in, or negligent operation of, the
property of another which may be brought on his premises
for the conduct of the business.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco. Alvin E. Weinberger,
Judge. Affirmed.
Action for damages for personal injuries and for wrongful
death. Judgment of nonsuit affirmed.
Belli, Ashe & Pinney, Melvin M. Belli, Betsy Fitzgerald
Rahn and Van H. Pinney for Appellants.
Robert H. Gerdes and Frederick W. Mielke, Jr., for Respondent.
EDMONDS, J.-Arthur Ralph Goodman, Jr., died and
Janet McCrum sustained permanent injuries as the result
of inhaling carbon monoxide from a butane gas heater in a
cabin which they were occupying overnight. Janet and the
heirs of Arthur have appealed from a judgment of nonsuit
in favor of Pacific Gas and Electric Company, the owner of
the property where the accident occurred.
E. L. Harris, the corporation's tenant, and his wife Dorothy
were in possession and control of the premises. Mr. and Mrs.
Harris, Helen M. Karteus, his mother, and P. G. & E. were
sued for damages by Janet and the heirs of Arthur.
According to the complaint, the Harrises ''were the lessees
in possession who . . . operated and maintained certain tourist cabins, a restaurant and bar'' and a garage, which property
was owned by P. G. & E. The property and improvements,
it was alleged, were leased by P. G. & E. with knowledge
that they were to be used ''for rental as lodgings by the general
public'' and that there existed upon the premises ''a dangerous and defective condition" in that the "tourist cabins
were so negligently constructed, maintained and operated, and
the heating appliances thereon were so dangerous and defective as to be dangerous, unsafe and unsuited for the purpose
for which they were to be used.'' The complaint further alleged
that Arthur and Janet were ''invited to and did rent one of
the tourist cabins . . . as a lodging for the night'' and that
the ''defendants so negligently maintained, heated, supervised,
constructed, managed and operated'' the cabin ''that the
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gas ,.;tovc . . . am1 the premises . . . were defective, dangqrrou,.; and a peril to hnman life." It was claimed that Arthur
uied aucl ,Janet ,.;nffered permanent injuries "solely by reason
of such negligence, and as a proximate consequence thereof~"
The separate demurrers of the defendants were overruled.
lJater, a motion by P. G. & E. for judgment on the pleadings
was denied.
By its answer, P. G. & E. admitteu that it owned the
real property and that the Harrises were in possession of and
managed it. As stated by P. G. & E., the Harrises were not its
lessees, but E. L. Harris was its tenant "holding over on a
month-to-month rental under the terms of an agreement of
lease for a period of one year." It was alleged that, prior to
the lease to Harris, the property had been leased to A. M.
Hinman, who had assigned his lease to Arthur W. Dahl and
Leonard A. Allen with the permission of P. G. & E. Thereafter,
Dahl and Allen "quitclaimed and surrendered" toP. G. & E.
all their right, title and interest in and to the Hinman lease.
P. G. & E. denied that it negligently constructed, maintained and operated the premises and that any injury was
caused by its acts. It admitted that Arthur and Janet were
asphyxiated by "operation of an unvented butane gas heater"
in one of the cabins and that Arthur died as a result. An
affirmative defense of contributory negligence also was pleaded.
Copies of the two leases of the property were attached to
the answer of P. G. & E. and incorporated therein by reference. The first, to Hinman, provided that the lessee had the
right to construct improvements ''proper and suitable for
residential and recreational purposes" upon the premises. He
could remove any improvements which he erected, with certain
exceptions not here material, before the termination of the
lease, but any structures not so removed "shall be deemed to
be fixtures constituting a part of said premises and title thereto
shall thereupon automatically vest in" P. G. & E.
The one-year lease to Harris contained a similar provision
and provided further that: "Lessee shall not permit any disorderly conduct or nuisance to exist on said premises." P. G.
& E. was given the right of entry during the term of the lease
' 'for the purpose of inspecting'' the premises and determining
if Harris was complying with the terms o:f the lease. Harris
promised to keep the buildings in repair and return them to
P. G. & E. in good condition at the termination o:f the lease.
Tt was provided that any holding over after the expiration of
4o c.2ct-9
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tit(' Jemw with tlH• eonsent of 1'. (). & B. Rhould be <~onsidt>red
tewnwy from month to month on the trrms 11nrl comlitions
spP(·ifierl in the lease.
TIH~ am;wer of the IlarriRes and Mrs. Kartem; denied all of
the material allegations of the complaint and specifically
llenied that the accident was due to any negligence upon their
part. 'l'hey also interposed the affirmative defense of contributory negligence.
'l'her·e is virtually no dispute as to the facts. Viewed in tlw
I ight most favorable to the plaintiffs, with all inconsistencies
ditiregarded and only tlwse inferences favorable to the plaintiffs whieh reasonably can be drawn from the evidence considered, the evidence may be summarized as follows:
P. G. & E. owned eertain real property which it leased to
Hinman. Sometime prior to the termination of that lease,
improvements were placed upon the property, including three
strPet(·ars eon verted into living and sleeping accommodations.
'l'hese improvements, not having been removed at the time
the lease was terminated, became the property of P. G. & E.
Hinman, with the permission of P. G. & E., assigned his
lease to Dahl and Allen, who thereafter purported to sublet
the premises to Green. Harris originally took possession of the
pr-operty from Green under an agreement whereby he purehased Green's stock in trade and operating equipment and
rentrd the premises from him. Thereafter, the Harrises purehased and installed the secondhand gas heater which was
defective.
~When the heater was purchased, the firebrick provided in
it~-; construction by the manufacturer to dispel carbon monoxide
gas was missing. No repairs were made to the heater, nor was
it ever adjusted for the use of butane gas. It was a type
designed to operate without a vent, and there was no way a
fine could be attached to it. Harris installed the heater by
eonneeting it to a pipe from a central butane gas tank which
supplied the various structures on the premises. This pipe
entered the streetcar cabin at an opening in the wall opposite
the side of the structure in which a vent had been constructed.
'rhe tank and gas for the premises were supplied by the Glenbrook Gas Company of Nevada City. The heater was not
fastene<l down, but "was just sitting there" on the floor. It
eould be removed simply by detaching the pipe connection.
In response to Green's request for a lease, P. G. & E. sent
an employee to the premises to determine whether he was
''a proper man to run a decent sort of place.'' This was
<1
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about three months after the heater was installed. P. G. & E.
then discovered that Harris was in possession of the premises.
1'he investigator was expected to determine whether the place
was "run sloppery, was it a messy looking place or not . . . "
and also if the premises were reasonably safe. Harris informed
the investigator that he intended to use the property as a
garag·e, motel and restaurant.
P. G. & E. decided to deal directly with Harris. It secured
a surrender of the existing lease from Dahl and Allen and
entered into a new one-year lease with Harris. At that time,
improvements upon the property consisted of a garage, rcstanrant, honse, pump bouse, water tower, three converted streetears, and two log cabins. Beside the house and visible from
the highway was a large sign reading, "CAnrNs 2.50 and UP."
The record contains only the most sketchy description of
the streetcar cabins. No dimensions are shown, nor is it
clear how many windows and doors each contained. Both
the windows and an outside door were in proper working
order; all opened easily. The windows were ''regular streetear windows,'' operated by pushing a strap up and permitting
the window to drop down. No directions were provided as
to the manner of operating them.
Each streetcar apparently was divided into two so-called
"cabins" by an open partition across the car. On each side
of the partition was a ben, eomplete with bedding, and a very
limited amount of other furniture. It appears that the space
on each side of the partition was heated by a single gas
heater installed in one of the two rooms. The streetcars never
were licensed for use as a motel.
The record shows that employees of P. G. & E., apparently
surveyors and other operating personnel, were on and about
the premises upon several occasions after the lease with Harris
was executed, but there is no evidence of any further attempt
by P. G. & E. to inspect the property. Sometime after the
Pxpiration of the term of tl1e lease, while Harris was holding
over on a month to month tenancy, an inspector for the Department of Industrial Relations, Division of Housing, inspected the premises. He informed the Harrises that the
streetcar cabins did not conform to statutory requirements
for an auto court. According to him, they were too small
and not of the proper structural dimensions, had insufficient
window spaee, and laeked running water with a drain. Beeause of these defects, he told the Harrises that the streetcar cabins must not be offered for overnight occupancy, but
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could be rented on a weekly or monthly basis. Thereafter,
they were not rented for one night except to Arthur and
Janet at the time of the accident. They were, however, rented
by the week or month during the succeeding year and had
been occupied by friends of the Harrises upon several occasions.
On the day preceding the accident, Arthur and Janet left
about 5 a. m. for a ski trip. They spent the entire day skiing,
and were returning home in Arthur's automobile when, about
midnight, it broke down near the Harris garage. A heavy
snowstorm was then raging. Harris towed the disabled vehicle to his garage and Arthur and ,Janet took refuge in the
adjacent restaurant. There they fell asleep at a table and,
after having been requested to move by a group desiring to
play cards, again fell asleep at the counter.
Dorothy Harris awakened them and asked if they would
like to sleep in a cabin overnight until the automobile could
be repaired. Janet refused, explaining that they were not
married, and Dorothy offered them adjoining cabins, which
they accepted. Dorothy prepared the streetcar cabin for
them and lighted the gas heater, turning it on almost all
the way. She did not open any windows, and when she left
the cabin she closed the door. Returning to the young couple,
she directed them to the cabin through the blizzard.
Upon entering the cabin, Janet took off her ski boots and
lay down upon the bed, covering herself with blankets. She
noticed that the heater was on, but paid no further attention
to it. According to her, Arthur tried without success to open
a window and commented that ''they wouldn't open.'' He
opened the door, but the wind blew it all the way open so
he slammed it shut. Janet fell asleep and remembered nothing
further until she awoke more than 30 hours later in a hospital. She recalled only a dim sensation of suffocation during the night and a feeling that she wanted to get out into
the fresh air.
The next morning. the Harrises found Arthur dead on the
bed in one room and ,Janet unconscious upon the floor in the
other one. Both were fully clothed except for shoes. The
heater was still burning, the windows and door were closed,
and snow was piled against the door. Medical testimony establishes that Janet suffered permanent injury as the result of
asphyxiation.
At the conclusion of the plaintiffs' case, all of the defendants moved for a nonsuit. The motions were granted
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at-> to Mrs. Kart(~us and P. G. & E. Thereupon, the court
was advised that the matter harl been settled as to the liarrises. The cam;e was then ordered off calendar and the jury
discharged. The appeal is from only the judgment of nonsuit in favor of P. G. & E.
The plaintiffs contend that a landlord who rents property
with knowledge that it is to be used for a public or semipublic purpose is liable to third persons injured upon the
premises by a defect therein which existed at the time of
making or renewing the lease. The questions of the existence
of a dangerous condition upon the premises, and its causal
relation to the injury, are, they say, ones of fact which should
have been left to the determination of the jury.
P. G. & E. does not disagree with the statement of the
rule that a landlord is liable for injuries resulting from a
defective condition of the premises existing at the time of
entering into a lease where the property is to be used for
a public purpose. However, it argues that the rule is inapplicable to the facts disclosed by this record. It concedes
that a dangerous condition, the defective gas heater, existed
upon the premises at the time of making the lease, and that
the heater caused the injuries. But the defect, it says, was
in the property of the tenant, and not in the premises rented
to Harris.
[1] ''A lessor who leases property for a purpose involving the admission of the public is under a duty to see that
it is safe for the purposes intended and to exercise reasonable care to inspect and repair the property before possession is transferred so as to prevent any unreasonable risk
of harm to the public who may enter." (Hayes v. Richfield
Oil Corp., 38 Cal.2d 375, 380 [240 P.2d 580] ; Bttrroughs
v. Ben's Auto Park, Inc., 27 Cal.2d 449, 453 [164 P.2d 897] .)
'rhe parties agree that this is the well established rule. The
difficulty arises in applying the principle to the facts of
this case.
Upon oral argument, for the first time, the plaintiffs contended that whether the defective heater was so affixed to
the premises as to have become a part of the realty was a
question of fact which should have been submitted to the
jury. They based their position in this regard upon Knell
v. JJ1orris, 39 Cal.2d 450, 456 [247 P.2d 352].
In that case, a question arose as to whether ''a nine-section,
cast-iron, gas-fired water heater" constituted a part of the
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prerni;;;es. The <:onrt said: "vVhether a water heater is realty
nr personalty is, of eo nnw, a question of faet ( eitations), and
various faeior;:; mm:t be eon:-;idPred, such as the manner of
its annexatio11, its adaptability to the purpose for which the
realty is used, and the intention of the party making the
annexation. (Citation.) As to innocent third parties, the
intent which controls is that which is reasonably manifested
by physieal fad;; and outwan1 appearances, rather than any
express or implied intent of those making the annexation.
(Citations.) In the present case it can reasonably be inferred that the heater was attached to the building by means
of gas and water pipes, and the evidence, although meager, is
sufficient to permit a finding that the heater was permanently
affixed to the realty and was adapted to the purpose for
which the premises were used.''
[2] Here, there is no evidence from which it reasonably
could be inferred that the gas heater was so affixed to the
building as to have become a part of the realty. It was a
small and easily portable piece of equipment, not fastened
down in any manner but "just sitting there" on the floor.
It was connected to the gas pipe inlet, but could be detached
simply and easily without affecting the premises. The very
defect which caused these injuries made it unadaptable to
the purpose for which the realty was used. Even if it had
been a proper heater, it would not have been "essential to
the ordinary and convenient use of the property." (M. P.
Moller, Inc. v. Wilson, 8 Cal.2d 31, 38 [63 P.2d 818] .) The
ease with which it could be removed and replaced without
affecting the physical premises negatived any intent to make
it a permanent fixture and part of the realty. Thus, the
evidence fails to raise any issue of fact which should have
been submitted to the jury.
'l'he plaintiffs concede that, if the heater had not become
a part of the realty, it was not the property of P. G. & E.
and was not leased by the corporation to Harris. However,
they argue that it was a defective condition existing ''on''
the premises at the time the lease was entered into. They also
claim that the premises were defective in that the streetcar
cabin was not fit for rental as a tourist cabin because it lacked
''vents which were connected up with the heaters,'' adequate
space to meet the requirements for sleeping accommodations,
and adequate window space for proper ventilation. This combination of defeets in the property leased and in a mechanical
device belonging to and operated by the lessee, they say,
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created a dangerous condition for which P. G. & E. may be
held liable.
[3] ~With every reasonable inference favorable to the plaintift's drawn from the evidence, there is no basis in the record
for the argument that the property of P. G. & E., the streetcar cabin, was itself defective. The cabin did not meet statutory requirements of construction for rental as an overnight accommodation for transients. But the state's inspector
told the Harrises that it was permissible to rent the cabin
by the week or month. In view of this evidence, it is impossible to draw the inference that it was unsuitable for
human occupancy. The cabin did have a vent which could
be connected to a heating unit and, despite an unwarranted
assertion to the contrary in the briefs of the plaintiffs, there
is no indication that the vent was faulty. Nothing in the
reeord supports the assertion that the cabin lacked proper
ventilation. It had windows and a door which could be
opened rasily. I<'rom the evidence, it appears that if they
had been opened, this tragedy would not have occurred.
[4] Although the point is not raised in the briefs, the
District Court of Appeal suggested that the premises were
defective because the gas feeder line entered the cabin at
a point on the wall opposite the location of the vent. However, there is no showing that the pipe was incapable of extension, or that a vented heater could not have been installed.
Nor is there any indication that a proper unvented heater
would have been mmafe if installed in the cabin. The point
of entry of the gas linr, obviously chosen for convenience, is
no basis for an inference that, because of its location, a safe
heating unit could not have been installed.
[5] The very most which is disclosed by the evidence is
the negligent operation of a defective gas heater in a cabin
which was otherwise safe and suitable for human habitation.
'!'here is no basis in the record for an inferenee that the
heater, although defeetive, would have eaused injury if operated with eircumspection in a properly ventilated room. On
the contrary, the evidenee shows that the heater had been
operated in this eabin without incident for a period of several years.
[6] Under the eireumstances, liability may be imposed
upon P. G. & K only if it was rrspom;ible for a latent dangerous condition of its lessee's property which existed upon
the premises at the time of the execution of the lease. Re-
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search of counsel and this court has disclosed no decision
in any jurisdiction imposing liability for the defective condition of property other than that leased. In every case
where, under the rule agreed upon by the parties, a landlord
has been found liable, the defect was one existing as a structural part of the property leased. (Hayes v. Richfield Oil
Corp., supra, unguarded grease pit in gasoline service station; Burroughs v. Ben's Auto Pa1·k, Inc., supra, unguarded
drop-off from parking lot retaining wall to areaway 12 feet
below; King v. New Masonic Temple Assn., 51 CaLApp.2d
512 [125 P.2d 559], uneven step from row of seats to floor
of auditorium; Boothby v. Town of Yreka City, 117 Cal.App.
643 [4 P.2d 589), faulty stairway in public building.) In
each instance, the defective condition, being a part of the
demised premises, was one which the lessor could have repaired and was under a duty to correct.
[7] Frequently, situations arise where injury results from
activity of the lessee upon premises which, by reason of some
defect, are not reasonably suitable for such conduct. When
this occurs, the lessor may be held liable, not for the fault
of the lessee, but only for his own fault in renting property
not safe for the activity to be conducted. A recent example
of this type of situation involved liability of the owner of
a fairgrounds for injuries suffered by a spectator at a "hot
rod'' race being conducted by its licensee. (Gibson v. Shelby
County Fair Assn., 241 Iowa 1349 [44 N.W.2d 362].) The
petition alleged that the barriers and guards upon the premises
were unsuitable for such purposes and that the plaintiff was
injured by a wheel which became detached from one of the
racing cars. The appellate court reversed an order sustaining
a motion to dismiss the petition. It agreed that the landlord
could not be liable for negligence in the operation of the
race, but held that the corporation owed a duty to see that
the premises were reasonably suited to the activity to be
eonducted.
In Larson v. Calder's Pa1·k Co., 54 Utah 325 [180 P. 599,
4 A.L.R. 731], the plaintiff was injured by a bullet from a
shooting gallery. The evidence disclosed that the walls of
the rented building in which the business was conducted were
dilapidated and contained large holes and cracks through
which bullets could escape. This condition existed at the
time of the lease. The lessor was held liable for the defective condition of the walls which rendered the building
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unsafe for the operation of a shooting gallery. Here, again,
liability was predicated upon the condition of the property
leased, not the fault of the lessee in operating the property.
Manning v. Leavitt Co., 90 N.H. 167 [5 A.2d 667], dealt
with injuries caused by a mechanical device upon leased
premises. The evidence indicated that a permanent wave
machine in a beauty parlor was either defective or negligently
operated, or both. Except for the fact that it is not shown
when the machine was installed upon the premises, the factual
situation is substantially identical to that in the present case.
[8] The court stated the rule of liability of the lessor as
follows:
"This plaintiff's injuries were not due to any want of care
with respect to the condition of the premises. The duty of
the invitor-lessor does not extend to matters having to do
merely with the lessee's management or operation of premises
which would be safe but for such management or operation,
at least where the lessee is in sole actual control, as was
true in this case. The fact that a fault of the lessee or his
servant commonly concurs with the lessor's failure to see
to the safety of the premises should not blind us to the basic
principle, upon which the invitation cases rest, that the lessor
in ordinary circumstances cannot be held for the lessee's
fault, but solely .for his own." (P. 169.)
The reasoning of the New Hampshire court is equally applicable to the present case. [9] P. G. & E. had a duty
to see that the property which it leased was reasonably safe
for the purposes for which it was to be used and the right
to repair such defects as it might discover in the premises.
But it was under no obligation to inspect property which
it did not own and which its lessee intended to use in the operation of his business. Failure to remedy any defect in
the appliance was a fault of Harris, not of P. G. & E.
[10] The rule that a lessor must make his property safe
for the purposes for which it is to be used cannot be extended to require him to insure against defects in, or negligent operation of, the property of another which may be
brought upon his premises for the conduct of the business.
Because the evidence discloses no defect in the leased
premises which may have caused or contributed to the injuries which are the basis of this action, the motion for nonsuit was granted properly as to P. G. & E. This conclusion
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makes it unnecessary to discuss any of the other contentions
of the parties.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and
Spence, J., concurred.
CAR'l'EH, J.-I dissent.
The facts are stated most favorably to the defendant in the
majority opinion, but even that statement of the facts of the
tragedy, together with the result achieved and set forth there,
are sufficient to shock the conscience and sense of justice of
any fair-minded person.
This case came to this court on an appeal from a judgment
of nonsuit entered in favor of the defendant Pacific Gas and
Electric Company. A motion for nonsuit can only be properly granted when, disregarding conflicting evidence and
giving to plaintiffs' evidence all the value to which it is legally
entitled, and indulging in every legitimate inference which
may be drawn from that evidence, it can be said that there
is no substantial evidence to support a verdict for plaintiffs
had such a verdict been rendered. That is the test which should
have been applied here.
The crucial question here is whether the heater, admittedly
defective, which was installed in the streetcar cabin occupied
by the two young people, (one of whom met his death as
a result thereof, the young woman receiving permanent
and serious injuries as a result of the experience) was a
fixture (part of the premises) belonging to the lessor, P. G.
& E., or personalty, belonging to the tenant.
It is said in the majority opinion that "there is no evidence
from which it could reasonably be inferred that the gas heater
was so affixed to the building as to have become a part of
the realty. It was a small and easily portable piece of equipment, not fastened down in any manner but 'just sitting
there' on the floor. It was connected to the gas pipe inlet, but
could be detached simply and easily without affecting the
premises. The very defect which caused these injuries made
it unadaptable to the purpose for which the realty was used.
Even if it had been a proper heater, it would not have been
'essential to the ordinary and convenient use of the property.'
(M.P. Moller, Inc. v. Wilson, 8 Cal.2d 31, 38 [63 P.2d 818] .)
The ease with which it could be removed and replaced without
affecting the physical premises negatived any intent to make
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it a permanent fixture and part of the realty. Thus, the evidence fails to raise any issue of fact which should have been
submitted to the jury." (Emphasis added.)
With the above statement, I most emphatically disagree.
This court has again paid .lip-service to established rules and
then proceeded to refuse to apply the rules to the situation
at hand. It is admitted that P. G. & E. had a duty to see that
the property which it leased was reasonably safe for the purposes for which it was to be used and the right to repair such
defects as it might discover in the premises; that ''A lessor
who leases property for a purpose involving the admission
of the public is under a duty to see that it is safe for the
purposes intended and to exercise reasonable care to inspect
and repair the property before possession is transferred so as
to prevent any unreasonable risk of harm to the public who
may enter" (Hayes v. Richfield Oil Corp., 38 Cal.2d 375,
:380 [240 P.2d 580] ; Burrmtghs v. Ben's Auto Park, Inc., 27
Cal.2d 449, 453 [164 P .2d 897] ) . The only way this court
could find to side-step these rules was to hold that there was
no evidence from which it could be inferred that the gas heater
was so affixed to the building as to have become part of the
realty. This statement ignores the recent case of Knell v.
J1forn:s, 39 Cal.2d 450 [247 P.2d 352].
In the Knell case, supra, it was said that "\Vhether a water
heater is realty or personalty is, of course, a question of fact
(see M. P. Moller, Inc. v. Wilson, 8 Cal.2d 31, 38 [63 P.2d
818) ; 22 Am.Jur. 772-773), and various factors must be considered, such as the manner of its annexation, its adaptability
to the purpose for which the realty is used, and the intention
of the party making the annexation. (See fHmms v. County
of Los Angeles, 35 Cal.2d 303, 309 [217 P.2d 936] .) As to
innocent third parties, the intent which controls is that which
is reasonably mani.fested by physical facts and outward apJ)eamnces, rather than any expr·ess or implied intent o.f those
making the annexation. (See Simms v. County of Los Angeles,
:)f) Cal.2cl 303, 309 [217 P.2d 936] ; Trabue Pittman Corp. v.
County of Los Angeles, 29 Cal.2d 385, 397 [175 P.2d 5121;
M. P. Moller, Inc. v. Wason, 8 Cal.2d 31, 37-38 [63 P.2d 818] ;
People v. Ch~trch, 57 Cal.App.2d Supp. 1032, 1048 !136 P.2d
1391.) Iu the present case it can reasonably be inferred that
the hPater was attaehed to the building by means of gas and
water pipes, and the evidenee, although meager, is sufficient
to wrmit a finding that the heater was permanently affixed
to the realty and was adapted to the purpose for which the
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premises were used. (Of. Broadway l1np. &; Inv. Co. v. Tumansky, 2 Oal.2d 465,468-469 [41 P.2d 553].)" (Emphasis
added.) All seven members of this court concurred in that
opinion. Five months later, a majority of this court now agree
that there is no evidence from which it could possibly be inferred that the heater here was affixed to the realty.
"No evidence"? In reviewing a judgment of nonsuit we
are supposed to state the facts most favorably to plaintiff
and to draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in his favor
(Knell v. Morris, supra, 39 Oal.2d 450).
The cabin was one presumably intended for use by memben:
of the public; it was located in the high Sierra; it was open
on February 3rd (the time of the death and injury) during
the skiing season which, in itself, allows the inference that
the weather was inclement, to say the least ; the windows of
the cabin were not opened by Mrs. Harris, and could not be
opened by the deceased; the door was so arranged that when
opened, it was blown wide open by the blizzard; the heater in
the cabin was admittedly defective and was connected to the
gas pipe inlet. From this evidence alone, it is certainly reasonable to infer that a cabin located in the mountains and apparently available for use by the public during the winter season
must have some means by which it could be heated; that the
heater was to be used for that purpose; that its presence there
would be considered by an innocent third person, if he gave the
matter a second thought, as much a part of the premises as
the walls of the building. From the fact that plaintiff's
decedent, an apparently healthy young man (inferable from
the fact that he had been on a skiing trip) could not open the
windows, it may easily be inferred that the windows were
difficult to open. To say, as it is said in the majority opinion,
that "Even if it had been a proper heater, it would not have
been ''essential to the ordinary and convenient use of the property' '' is so ridiculous, when applied to this case, that it
justifies the appellation of Mr. Bumble in Dickens' Oliver
Twist that "the law is a ass, a idiot." It completely ignores
the practicalities of trying to stay in a cabin, without heating
facilities, in zero and sub-zero weather.
Rather than drawing inferences and stating facts favorable
to the plaintiffs, as we are required to do, the majority of this
court goes to great lengths to draw unfavorable inferences
and state facts unfavorable to plaintiffs. It is said that the
heater was easily removable, that it was "just sitting there,
on the floor; that it was unadaptable to the purpose for which
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the realty was to be used because of the "very defect which
caused these injuries." Of cour·se, an innocent third person
would at once be aware of the defects in the heater, and say
to himself that "this heater is not part of the realty" before
putting himself to bed. It is also inferred that even a "proper
heater" would not have been essential to the ordinary and
convenient use of the property! It is stated in the majority
opinion that "Nothing in the record supports the assertion
that the cabin lacked proper ventilation. It had windows and
a door which could be opened easily.'' ''Nothing in the record''
is an erroneous statement. The record shows that an inspector
for the Department of Industrial Relations, Division of Housing, inspected the premises and that one of the reasons this
cabin could not be used for motel purposes was that there
was inadequate window space for proper ventilation. The
record also shows that the windows could not be opened easily.
In M.P. Moller, Inc. v. Wilson, 8 Cal.2d 31 [63 P.2d 818],
the court said that ''Whether under the circumstances of each
case the property has lost its character as personalty and has
become a fixture is primarily a question of fact to be determined by the evidence.'' In Simms v. County of Los Angeles, 35 Cal.2d 303, 309 [217 P.2d 936] it was said "It is
settled that three tests must be applied 'in determining
whether or not an article is a fixture-namely: (1) the manner
of its annexation; (2) the adaptability to the use and purpose
for which the realty is used; and (3) the intention of the party
making the annexation.' (San Diego T. & S. Bank v. San
D1:ego County, 16 Cal.2d 142, 149 [105 P.2d 94, 133 A.L.R.
416].) It is also settled that for tax purposes the 'intention'
must be determined by the physical facts or reasonably manifested outward appearances without regard to the annexor's
status as landlord or tenant.'' In Trabue Pittman Corp. v.
County of Los Angeles, 29 Cal.2d 385, 393 [175 P.2d 512], it
was said "Section 660 of the Civil Code defines 'fixtures' as
things that are permanently resting upon or attached to the
land or building, but the fact that a trade fixture is removable
under Civil Code, section 1019, does not, as plaintiff contends,
necessarily negative such element of permanence. We have
already indicated that for the most part assessors must be
allowed to act on the basis of outward appearances. Moreover,
in distinguishing permanence from transitoriness it is not
necessary to identify it with perpetuality. (Southern Cal. Tel.
Co. v. State Boa1·d of Eqnalization, snpra, 12 Cal.2d 127, 136
[82 P.2d422].) 'It appears to be sufficient that it [the article
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annexed] is intended to remain where placed as long as the
land or building to which it is annexed may be used for the
same purpose.' ( 36 C .•T.S., Fixtures, § 2, p. 900.) 'It is sufficient if the article shall appear to be intended to remain where
fastened until worn out, until the purpose to which the realty
is devoted has been accomplished or until the article is superseded by another article more suitable for the purpose.' (San
Diego Trust & Sa;v. Bank v. County of San Diego, supra, 16
Ca1.2d 142, 151; 26 C.J. 657.)"
'l'he question of whether or not an appliance attached to
realty is a fixture or personalty is always a question of fact
unless the evidence is undisputed and is susceptible only of
one inference (San Diego Trust & Sav. Bank v. County of San
Diego, 16 Cal.2d 142 [105 P.2d 94, 133 A.L.R. 416] ).
Applying the three tests set forth in the Simms case, supra,
it is at once apparent that the evidence was more than sufficient to permit submission of the question of whether or not
the heater in question was a fixture or personalty to the jury.
The heater here was physically annexed to the realty by a
gas pipe inlet. Its adaptability to the use and purpose for
which the realty was used is apparent. It was the only heater
available to produce warmth in a cabin located in the mountains where zero and sub-zero weather prevailed during the
wintertime which was when this tragedy occurred. The intention of the party making the annexation must be determined
by that which is reasonably manifested by physical facts and
outward appearances "rather than any express or implied intent of those making the annexation" (Knell v. Morris, supra,
::39 Cal.2d 450). Certainly the article here involved appeared
to be intended to remain where it was fastened until it was
worn out, or until the purpose to which the realty was devoted
had been accomplished or until the article was superseded
by another article more suitable for the purpose (San Diego
Trust & Sav. Bank v. County of San Diego, supra, 16 Cal.2d
142).
I would reverse the judgment.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied March
16, 1953. Carter, .T., was of the opinion that the petition
shonh1 be granted.

